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11( THE SUPREME COURT or TH! STATE or UTAH 
OWBN RAY UUTESON 
ve. 
Plaiftt iff aa4 
Appellant 
JACOUELlMI A. toruTESON 
Defendant and 
l.esl'ondent 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OV TH! MA'?Ult! OF TH! CASI 
This is respondent appeal tl'tat the lower court shoul• 
not have inter~reted the facts nf this matter to co•stltuta that 
re•pondent did reside wit~ a pet909 of the opposite ses •• set forth 
ift SactiOft 30·3-5(3), Utai. Cade Anftotated 1953, as ame11de•. 
DISPOSI!I9M 11 LCllEJ. toutT 
The Honora~l• C~rietiaa K. Durham, ~a Decemh.er 19, 1979. 
after rec•iving testimoay duriGI t!M! Order to Show Cause lea!ing 't\ded 
that even though the def eftdaftt it.I occupy the same residence With a 
person of the opposite sex for apl"t'oximately two lDet\tbe. abe did not 
resicle witb that person PGnuant to !eetioa 30-l•SC3), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amende4. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully seeks affirmation of the trial 
judge's order that Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amendad, was not violated by respondent and that alimony payments 
not be terminated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 13, 1979, the Honorable Christine M. Durham 
ruled, among other things, that the appellant was to pay alimony to 
the respondent for an indefinite period of time. On or about 
August 27, 1979, respondent and her children moved into a neighbor's 
house because all the utilities had been shut off at the respondent's 
house. Respondent had no income, and appellant did not substantially 
comply with the support order to allow funds to keep the utilities 
current. 
Subsequently, on November 7, 1979, after respondent 
successfully obtained judgment against appellant for non-support 
·- . 
payments in the amount of $1442.33, and execution thereof, respondent 
paid her utilities indebtedness and moved back into her home with her 
children and all of their belongings. 
Appellant argues that respondent's move to the neighbor's 
house for approximately two months and that subsequent sexual relations 
with that neighbor constitutes residing set forth in Section 30-3-5(3), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended: 
"(3) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse shall be terminated upon application 
of that party 'establishing that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex, unless it 
-2-
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is further established by the person receiving alimony 
that the relationship or association between them is 
without any sexual contact. "' 
(Emphasis mine.} 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT WAS NOT RESIDING WITH A PERSON 
OF THE OPPOSITE SEX FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 30-3-5(3), 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, AND 
ALIMONY SHOULD NOT BE TERMINATED 
Although appellant fails to state the reasons for 
respondent's move from her residence for the space of approximately 
two months, the transcript of the hearing of plaintiff 'a Order to 
Show Cause indicates clearly the problems that respondent had. In 
determining the interpretation of "residing" it would be helpful to 
examine respondent's intent. The parties' son Ray testified that the 
utilities were shut off and that it was necessary to move out (Tr 13). 
He further testified that, "we left most of our furnishings at home" 
(Tr 17) and had no intent to abandon their home but would return to 
it when, "we had money to turn back on the electricity and the gas 
that had been turned off." (Tr 18). 
Respondent's testimony concerning her intent to reside 
is uncontroverted and in agreement with that of her son. She stated 
that Dick (appellant) would not pay her any money. (Tr 30). She had 
no other source of income except the support payments from her former 
husband. When he refused to make regular payments, the utilities were 
disconnected, making her residence uninhabitable (Tr 17). 
Although she and her children slept in the neighbor's 
h~~se and although she participated in sexual contact with a person 
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of the opposite sex, she never intended to abandon the home awarded 
to her by the trial court or reside w-j.tb the person of the opposite 
sex. R~spondent spent much of the daytime hours at her own home 
without utilities. She spent time washing walls, cleaning cupboards, 
and doing yard work (Tr 28). It was clearly never appellant's intent 
to abandon her own home to reside permanently with her neighbor (Tr 28). 
Consistent with respondent's not having the intent to 
reside with her neighbor, she did return to her own residence on 
November 7, 1979. According to the file, this was the same date 
!! 
she received funds from the execution against appellant. It was 
her testimony that upon receiving funds from the execution, 
respondent paid the utilities indebtedness and moved her family 
and possessions back into her own house on November 7, 1979 (Tr 29). 
Respondent had no knowledge of the Order to Show Cause 
hearing to terminate alimony. Although the action was filed on 
November 5, 1979, she had no notice until November 17, 1979, when 
she was personally served. Therefore, consistent with her intention, 
on the day she finally received sufficient funds the-utilities were 
paid and she moved back into her own house. There was never any intent 
to·::remain at the neighbor 's home. 
It is clear from the foregoing and from her testimony 
that respondent never intended to reside with a person of the opposite 
sex. Taking this pos~tion one step further, respondent did not in fact 
reside with a person of the opposite sex. A workable definition of 
"reside" is not provided for us, although California law bas treated 
this matter to some degree. 
-4-
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!), 
California has been struggling with this issue for some 
time. Reviewing statutory and case law of California may be helpful. 
Prior to 1976 the Civil Code of California, Section 4801, used the 
term "living with" rather than "reside.": 
"Upon petition of a spouse who has been ordered to pay 
support under Section 4801, the court shall revoke the 
order for support upon proof that the spouse to whom 
support has been ordered to be paid is living with a 
person of the opposite sex and holding himself or herself 
out as the spouse of the person for a total of 30 days 
or more, either consecutive or non-consecutive, although 
not married to the person. The court shall order the 
restitution of any support which has been paid since 
the date upon which the spouse to whom support has been 
ordered to be paid commenced holding himself or herself 
out as the spouse of the person." 
The above formula of living with a person of the opposite 
sex for more than 30 days and holding himself or herself out to be 
the spouse of that person gave way to the current California statute 
that there is a presumption of decreased need and modification of 
support payments to the supported former spouse cohabiting with a 
person of the opposite sex. The court in In re Lieb ( 1978) 80·-:.. CA 3d 629 
further treats this amendment in that, "If cohabitation is found to 
exist, the rebuttable presumption of decreased need for spousal.support 
must be overcome by the supported spouse." 
The respondent neither resided nor lived with a person of 
the opposite sex although she spent nights there and moved "the kids, 
beds, my stove and my refrigerator, and my freezer, and our dressers 
with our clothes in." (Tr 28). She at no time abandoned or attempted 
to abandon her home. She never held herself out to be the wife of the 
neighbor~ There was certainly no decreased need in her ra~eiving 
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support payments from her former spouse. The only benefit she 
received for two months was free lodging, she even paid for the 
groceries for her own family (Tr 22). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant leads us to believe that he was oppressed 
by being under a court order to pay support to his former wife, 
and that he was somehow wronged when respondent left her household 
for that of a neighbor. It is clear from the transcript and the 
record that appellant refused to comply with the court's support 
order. The record shows a judgment was obtained and a subsequent 
execution carried out at appellant's bank and credit union. Further, 
the day respondent received funds from the execution, she paid the 
utilities and moved back into her home. 
Respondent, desperate for help and not in possession of 
funds, protected herself and her children by responding to the help 
of her neighbor for lodging until utilities were on in her own house. 
This desperate circumstance was caused directly by appellant due to 
his refusal to comply with a court support order. If appellant prevails 
it would signal others who pay support to former spouses to cut off all 
payments and force them into desperate times or some perceived statutory 
wrongdoing. The ultimate incentive would be great to have the payor 
former spouse to relieve himself of support obligations. 
Respectfully submitted this __ day of ____ , 1980. 
H. DELBERT WELKER 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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